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THE UNIFORM SALES ACT IN THE STATE
OF WASHINGTON*
PART III.
Sec. 28. Negotiation of Negotuible Documents by Delivery.
A negotiable document of title may be negotiated by delivery:
(a) Where by the terms of the document the carrier, warehousemen or
other bailee issuing the same undertakes to deliver the goods to the
bearer; or, (b) Where by the terms of the document the carrier, ware-
houseman, or other ballee issuing the same undertakes to deliver the
goods to the order of a specified person, and such person or a subse-
quent Indorsee of the document has indorsed It in blank or to bearer.
Where by the terms of a negotiable document of title the goods are
deliverable to bearer or where a negotiable document of title has been
indorsed In blank or to bearer, any holder may indorse the same to
himself or to any specified person, and in such case the document shall
thereafter be negotiated only by the Indorsement of such indorsee.
This section is identical with section 3623 of Remington's Compiled
Statutes (Pierce's Code, §7177). The corresponding section of the
Bills of Lading Act, section 3674 of Remington's Compiled Statutes
(Pierce's Code, §455), differs from subsection (b) only in omitting
the words "or to bearer."
Sec. 29. Negotiation of Negotiable Documents by Indorsement.
A negotiable document of title may be negotiated by the Indorsement
of the person to whose order the goods are by the terms of the docu-
ment deliverable. Such indorsement may be in blank, to bearer or to a
specified person. If indorsed to a specified person, it may be again
negotiated by the indorsement of such person in blank, to bearer or to
another specified person. Subsequent negotiations may be made in like
manner.
This section duplicates sections 3624 and 3675 of Remington's Com-
piled Statutes (Pierce's Code, §§ 456, 7178), except that in the latter,
the Uniform Bills of Lading Act, the words "to bearer" are not in-
cluded. The analogy of this and the previous section to bills of exchange
and promissory notes is apparent.
Sec. 30. Negotiable Documents of Title Marked "Not Negotiable."
If a document of title which contains an undertaking by a carrier,
warehouseman or other.bailee to deliver the goods to the bearer, to a
specified person or order, or to the order of a specified person, or which
contains words of like import, has placed upon it the words "Not negot-
*Continued from Vol. II, No. 3, Page 168.
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iable," "Non negotiable" or the like, such a document may nevertheless be
negotiated by the holder and is a negotiable document of title within the
meaning of this act. But nothing in this act contained shall be construed
as limiting or defining the effect upon the obligations of the carrier, ware-
houseman or other bailee issuing a document of title or placing therein
the words "Not negotiable," "Non-negotiable" or the like.
Statutes were passed in many jurisdictions making documents of ttle
negotiable unless marked "Not negotiable" as merchants were accus-
tomed to treat them as negotiable. Thereupon carriers marked "Not
negotiable" even on negotiable bills of lading. This led to confusion
and hence the provision of this section. While there are no corres-
ponding sections in the other acts, a part of section 3591 of Reming-
ton's Compiled Statutes (Pierce's Code, § 7145) provides: "No
provision shall be inserted in a negotiable receipt that it is non-negotiable.
Such provision, if inserted, shall be void." Similarly, a part of section
3651 of Remington's Compiled Statutes (Pierce's Code, § 432)
provides. "Any provision in such a bill that it is non-negotiable shall
not affect its negotiability within the meaning of this Act."
Sec. 31. Transfer of Non-Negotiable Documents.
A document of title which is not in such form that it can be negotiated
by delivery may be transferred by the holder by delivery to a purchaser
or donee. A non-negotiable document can not be negotiated and the
indorsement of such a document gives the transferee no additional right.
It is to be noted that the term "transfer" is used to distinguish from
"negotiation." The section is identical with section 3625 and substan-
tially the same as section 3676, of Remington's Compiled Statutes
(Pierce's Code, §§ 3180, 457), being the corresponding sections in the
acts under comparison.
Sec. 32. Who May Negotiate a Document?
A negotiable document of title may be negotiated by any person in
possession of the same, however such possession may have been acquired
if, by the terms of the document, the bailee issuing it undertakes to
deliver the goods to the order of such person, or if at the time of negoti-
ation the document is in such form that it may be negotiated by
delivery.
This section is identical with section 3677 of Remington's Compiled
Statutes (Pierce's Code, § 458) relating to bills of lading. It makes
the bill fully negotiable and even a finder or a thief may acquire
totle if in proper form as in the case of negotiable bills and notes.
This represents a change from the section as originally adopted by the
Commissioners of Uniform Laws, which was substantially in accord
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with the corresponding section of the Warehouse Receipts Act. This
section 3626 of Remington's Compiled Statutes (Pierce's Code, § 7180)
provides that "A negotiable receipt may be negotiated by any person
to whom the possession or custody of the receipt has been intrusted by
the owner, etc." This distinction should be noted.
Sec. 33. Rights of Person to Whom Document Has Been Negotiated.
A person to whom a negotiable document of title has been duly negoti-
ated acquires thereby- (a) Such title to the goods as the person negotiat-
ing the document to him had or had ability to convey to a purchaser In
good faith for value and also such title to the goods as the person to
whose order the goods were to be delivered by the terms of the docu-
ment had or had ability to convey to a purchaser in good faith for value;
and (b) The direct obligation of the bailee issuing the document to hold
possession of the goods for him according to the terms of the document
as fully as if such bailee had contracted directly with him.
The foregoing section is substantially the same as sections 3627 and
3678 of Remington's Compiled Statutes (Pierce's Code, §§ 7181, 459).
Sec. 34. Rights of Person to Whom Document Has Been Trans-
ferred.
A person to whom a document of title has been transferred, but not
negotiated, acquires thereby, as against the transferor, the title to the
goods, subject to the terms of any agreement with the transferor.
If the document is non-negotiable, such person also acquires the right
to notify the bailee who issued the document of the transfer thereof,
and thereby to acquire the direct obligation of such bailee to hold pos-
session of the goods for him according to the terms of the document.
Prior to the notification of such bailee by the transferor or transferee
of a non-negotiable document of title, the title of the transferee to the
goods and the right to acquire the obligation of such ballee may be de-
feated by the levy of an attachment or execution upon the goods by a
creditor of the transferor, or by a notification to such bailee by the trans-
feror or a subsequent purchaser from the transferor of a subsequent sale
of the goods by the tansferor.
This section is almost identical with section 3628 and section 3679
of Remington's Compiled Statutes (Pierce's Code, §§ 7182, 460),
except that section 3679 (Pierce's Code, § 460) contains the words
"by garnishment" and, further, defines what constitutes notification.
Sec. 35. Transfer of Negotiable Document Without Indorsement.
Where a negotiable document of title is transferred for value by
delivery and the indorsement of the transferor is essential for negotiation,
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
the transferee acquires a right against the transferor to compel him to
Indorse the document unless a contrary intention appears. The negotia-
tion shall take effect as of the time when the Indorsement is actually
made.
Sections 3629 and 3680 of Remington's Compiled Statutes (Pierce's
Code, §§ 7183, 461) are practically the same as the foregoing
section, except that section 3680 (Pierce's Code, § 461) pro-
vides that the obligation may be specifically enforced. The provision
is taken from a similar provision in the Negotiable Instruments Law
Sec. 36. Warranties on Sale of Document.
A person who for value negotiates or transfers a document of title
by indorsement or delivery, including one who assigns for value a claim
secured by a document of title unless a contrary intention appears, war-
rants:
(a) The document Is genuine;
(b) That he has a legal right to negotiate or transfer It;
(c) That he has knowledge of no fact which would impair the validity
or worth of the document; and
(d) That he has a right to transfer the title to the goods and that the
goods are merchantable or fit for a particular purpose, whenever such
warranties would have been implied if the contract of the parties had
been to transfer without a document of title the goods represented
thereby.
This section duplicates sections 3630 and 3681 of Remington's Com-
piled Statutes (Pierce's Code, §§ 7184, 462), except that section 3681
(Pierce's Code, § 462) contains an additional provision that "In the
case of an assignment of a claim secured by a bill, the liability of the
assignor shall not exceed the amount of the claim."
Sec. 37 Indorser Not a Guarantor
The Indorsement of a document of title shall not make the Indorser
liable for any failure on the part of the bailee who issued the document
or previous indorsers thereof to fill their respective obligations.
Indorsements of documents of title have always been understood to
amount merely to conveyances by the indorsers and were not treated as
contracts of guaranty The corresponding sections to the same effect
are 3631 and 3682 of Remington's Compiled Statutes (Pierce's Code,
§§ 7185, 463)
Sec. 38. When Negotiation Not Impaired by Fraud, Mistake or
Duress.
WASHINGTON SALES ACT
The validity of the negotiation of a negotiable document of title is
not impaired by the fact that the negotiation was a breach of duty on
the part of the person making the negotiation, or by the fact that the
owner of the document was deprived of the possession of the same by
loss, theft, fraud, accident, mistake, duress or conversion, if the person
to whom the document was negotiated or a person to whom the docu-
ment was subsequently negotiated paid value therefor, in good faith,
without notice of the breach of duty, or loss, theft, fraud, accident, mis-
take, duress or conversion.
This section has been changed or amended as originally adopted by
the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws by adding the words "loss,
theft, fraud, accident," to the words "mistake, duress, or conversion."
This is in accord with section 32, supra, which provides that a negot-
iable document of title may be negotiated by any person in possession
however such possession may have been acquired if, etc. The section
adds nothing to section 32, sufta, so far as its effect is concerned and
seems to have been included in the Act merely to emphasize the mercantile
theory of negotiability.125 The corresponding section of the Warehouse
Receipts Act,128 does not contain the words "loss, theft, fraud, accident,"
and the corresponding section of the Bills of Lading Act, 2 7 does not
contain the words "loss" or "theft", otherwise they are substantially
the same. As section 76-b, infra, provides "Nothing in this Act shall be
construed to repeal, limit or modify any provisions of-the uniform
warehouse receipts act, 28 nor the uniform bills of lading act, 29 negot-
iable warehouse receipts will still require possession through an "in-
trusting" as provided by sections 3626 and 3633 of Remington's Com-
piled Statutes (Pierce's Code, §§ 7180, 7187)
Sec. 39. Attachment or Levy Upon Goods for Which a Negotiable
Document Has Been Issued.
If goods are delivered to a bailee by the owner or by a person whose
act In conveying the title to them to a purchaser in good faith for value
would bind the owner and a negotiable document of title is Issued for
them they can not thereafter, while in the possession of such bailee, be
attached by garnishment or otherwise or be levied upon under an execu-
tion unless the document be first surrendered to the bailee or its negotia-
tion enjoined. The bailee shall in no case be compelled to deliver up the
actual possession of the goods until the document is surrendered to him
or Impounded by the court.
This section is duplicated by sections 3611 and 3670 of Remington's
Compiled Statutes (Pierce's Code §§ 7165, 451). It might be
2 WILIsToN, SALES (2 ed. 1924) § 436.
Rem. Comp. Stat. § 3633, P. C. § 7187.
'-Rem. Comp. Stat. § 3684, P. C. § 465.
Rem. Comp. Stat. § 3587-3646, P. C. §§ 7141-7201.
'"Rem. Comp. Stat. §§ 3647-3701, P. C. §8 428-482.
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urged under the mercantile conception of a document of title that
the creditor should be limited in his relief entirely to the negotiable
document of title, but the same thing is indirectly accomplished by an
attachment or levy on the goods and impounding the negotiable docu-
ment of title.
Sec. 40. Creditors Remedies to Reach Negotiable Documents.
A creditor whose debtor is the owner of a negotiable document of
title shall be entitled to such aid from the courts of appropriate juris-
diction by injunction and otherwise in attaching such document or in
satisfying the claim by means thereof as is allowed at law or in equity
in regard to property which can not readily be attached or levied upon
by ordinary legal process.
This section is identical with sections 3612 and 3671 of Remington's
Compiled Statutes (Pierce's Code, §§ 7166, 452) It relates
to and should be considered in connection with the preceding section.
It may be noted that an injunction would not preclude a bona fide
purchaser for value without notice from securing a good title from the
one enjoined.
PERFORMANCE OF THE CONTRACT
Sec. 41. Seller Must Deliver and Buyer Accept Goods.
It is the duty of the selfer to deliver the goods, and of the buyer to
accept and pay for them, in accordance with the terms of the contract
to sell or sale.
This merely states an obvious proposition. It finds illustration in
the cases cited under the succeeding rules, and is the law everywhere.
Sec. 42. Delivery and Payment Are Concurrent Conditions.
Unless otherwise agreed, delivery of the goods and payment of the
price are concurrent conditions; that is to say, the seller must be ready
and willing to give possession of the goods to the buyer in exchange for
the price and the buyer must be ready and willing to pay the price in
exchange for possession of the goods.
This states the general rule and is the law of the state of Washing-
ton. Tender of delivery must be made at the place of delivery when
and where specified except when excused by the buyer's prior repudia-
tion, in which event it is sufficient that the seller is ready and willing.
Similar rules apply as to tender of payment by the buyer. There are
a number of cases recognizing the rule in Washington. 3 °
"' Loews v. Long, 76 Wash. 480, 186 Pac. 673 (1913) Dement Bros.
Co. v. Goon, 104 Wash. 603, 177 Pac. 354 (1919) Farmer's Grai & Sup-
ply Co. v. Lemley, 105 Wash. 508, 178 Pac. 640 (1919) Sussman v. Gus-
tav, 109 Wash. 459, 186 Pac. 882 (1920).
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Sec. 43. Place, Time and Manner of Delivery.
(1) Whether it Is for the buyer to take possession of the goods or for
the seller to send them to the buyer is a question depending in each
case on the contract, express or implied, between the parties. Apart
from any such contract, express or implied, or usage of trade to the
contrary, the place of delivery is the seller's place of business, if he have
one, and If not, his residence; but in case of a contract to sell or a sale
of specific goods, which to the knowledge of the parties when the contract
or the sale was made were in some other place, then that place is the
place of delivery.
(2) Where by a contract to sell or a sale the seller is bound to send
the goods to the buyer, but no time for sending them is fixed, the seller
is bound to send them within a reasonable time.
(3) Where the goods at the time of sale are in the possession of a
third person, the seller has not fulfilled his obligation to deliver to the
buyer unless and until such third person acknowledges to the buyer that
he holds the goods on the-buyer's behalf; but as against all others than
the seller the buyer shall be regarded as having received delivery from
the time when such third person first has notice of the sale. Nothing
in this section, however, shall affect the operation of the issue or transfer
of any document of title to goods.
(4) Demand or tender of delivery may be treated as ineffectual unless
made at a reasonable hour. What is a reasonable hour is a question
of fact.
(5) Unless otherwise agreed, the expense of and incidental to putting
the goods in a deliverable state must be borne 'by the seller.
Subsection (1) is a declaration of the existing law It is, of course,
open to the parties to make such agreement as they may choose as to
the place of delivery, and if they make no express agreement, usage or
circumstances may take the place of express language.' In Loewt v.
Long, 32 the court found that the fact that letters and telegrams con-
stituting a sale of hops did not fix the time and place of delivery was
immaterial where no specific agreement was made therefor and by the
custom of the trade delivery was to be at the nearest railway station on
or before a certain date. There are a number of other washington cases
recognizing the rule as stated in the last half of this subsection. 3 3
Subsection (2) is the law everywhere. What is a reasonable time
In See, Sales Act, § 41, supra, and WimSTON, SALES (2 ed. 1924)
450.
11 Note 130, supra.
2" Nelson V. Imperial Trading Co., 69 Wash. 442, 125 Pac. 777 (1912)
Pactfic National Bank v. S. F Bridge Co., 23 Wash. 425, 63 Pac. 207
(1900) Wright v. Seattle Grocery Co., 105 Wash. 383, 177 Pac. 818 (1919).
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is a question of fact to be determined in each particular case. The rule
has been accepted and applied in Washington without comment.'"
Subsection (3) also represents the general rule. As between the
parties obviously the seller has not fulfilled his duty of delivery to the
buyer by merely notifying the bailee. The bailee must assent to the
request. The rule is recognized in High v. Emerson,3 ' in which
case the court says. "It seems to be recognized that delivery of personal
property may be made by an arrangement that some third person in
possession of the goods may hold them as bailee for the purchaser or
owner."
As to third parties, however, it is sufficient that the bailee has notice,
for whether he assents to the transfer or not, he is bailee for the buyer
and cannot thereafter disregard the buyer's rights. He may refuse to
continue to hold for the buyer, but only by surrendering the goods
to him.13 6 This provision becomes of importance in consideration of
sections 25 and 26 of the Sales Act, discussed supra, so far as the rights
of the seller's creditors or subsequent purchasers from the seller, are
concerned. This part of the rule was recognized in Churchill v.
Miller 17 although distinguished in that case on the basis that the
third party did not actually have possession.
Subsection (4) states the existing law In Nelson v. Imperial Trad-
Ing Co.,1ss the court held that the facts in that case required delivery
during business hours.
Subsection (5) states the general rule, the duty of putting the goods
in a deliverable state being considered as necessarily incidental to the
duty of the seller to deliver the goods.
Sec. 44. Delivery of Wrong Quantity.
(1) Where the seller delivers to the buyer a quantity of goods less
than he contracted to sell, the buyer may reject them, but if the buyer
accepts or retains the goods so delivered, knowing that the seller is
not going to perform the contract in full, he must pay for them at the
contract rate. If, however, the buyer has used or disposed of the goods
delivered before he knows that the seller is not going to perform his
"'Pacific National Bank v. S. F Bridge Co., note 133, supra, Wright
v. Seattle Grocery Co., note 133, supra, Menz Lumber Co. v. McNeely 9
Co., 58 Wash. 223, 108 Pac. 621 (1910) Jones-Scott Co. v. Ellensburg
Milling Co., 108 Wash. 73, 183 Pac. 113 (1919).
12 23 Wash. 103, 108, 62 Pac. 455 (1900).
"'a WILLsToN, SALEs (2 ed. 1924) § 454.52,90 Wash. 694, 156 Pac. 851 (1916).
"28 Note 133, supra.
WASHINGTON SALES ACT
contract in full, the buyer shall not be liable for more than the fair
value to him of the goods so received.
(2) Where the seller delivers to the buyer a quanity of goods larmer
than he contracted to sell, the buyer may accept the goods included in
the contract and reject the rest, or he may reject thie whole. If the
buyer accepts the whole of the goods so delivered he must pay for them
at the contract rate.
(3) Where the seller delivers to the buyer the goods he contracted to
sell mixed with goods of a different description not included in the
contract, the buyer may accept the goods which are in accordance with
the contract and reject the rest, or he may reject the whole.
(4) The provisions of this section are subject to any usage of trade,
special agreement or course of dealing between the parties.
Subsection (1) is in accordance with the weight of authority. It is
to be noted that it is not a case of acceptance of an offer or order but
rather deals with delivery under a contract already formed. The
effect of this section is to require an exact compliance so customary in
the law of mercantile contracts. It provides that the buyer may
reject, not necessarily rescind, as it may still be possible for the seller
to make a correct tender. That this is possible is intimated in the
opinion of Justice Tolman in Prescott & Co. v. Powles & Co. 3 9 Relat-
ing to exact performance, -he states: "It is contended, and generally
held, that the delivery of goods under an executory contract must be
of the exact quantity ordered, otherwise the buyer may refuse to accept
them."
Where there is knowledge on the part of the buyer that the seller is
not going to perform the contract in full, and a less quantity is de-
livered, the buyer may be held for the purchase price on the theory of
a new offer and acceptance. Where there is a partial delivery received
by the buyer still contemplating full performance, the liability of the
buyer is to be found in quasi-contract. While it is quite generally held
that the party in default on a contract may not recover there is a fairly
well recognized exception made in the case of goods in th buyer's
possession capable of being returned which he retains with knowledge
that the seller cannot or will not perform the contract in its entirety.
The Act provides and it seems just that the buyer pay the contract price
for the goods retained under each of these contingencies. It might be
inferred that the buyer is required to pay this price absolutely It will
be noted, however, that under section 49, infra, acceptance does not bar
an action for damages and undoubtedly the buyer could recoup for the
1i9113 Wash. 177, 179, 193 Pac. 680 (1920).
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
damage suffered by the seller's failure to deliver the balance of the
goods. 140  Specifying that the buyer is liable when he retains goods after
knowledge, with the capability of returning, it seems logical to make
the buyer liable, even though not capable of returning the goods, and the
Act so provides, making him liable, however, only for the fair value of
the goods which he received.
Subsection (2) seems clear on contractual principles and is similar
in principle to the first provision in subsection (1)
Subsection (3) is merely another specific application, and is similar
to subsection (2).
Subsection (4) seems obvious. It finds illustration in the cases of
fungible goods in mass, for example the delivery of warehouse receipts
takes the place of an actual delivery of the goods in the case of grain in
elevators.
Sec. 45. Delivery in Installments.
(1) Unless otherwise agreed, the buyer of goods is not bound to accept
delivery thereof by installments.
(2) Where there is a contract to sell goods to be delivered by stated
installments, which are to be separately paid for, and the seller makes
defective deliveries In respect of one or more Installments, or the buyer
neglects or refuses to take delivery of or pay for one or more installments,
it depends in each case on the terms of the contract and the circum-
stances of the case, whether the breach of contract is so material as to
justify the injured party in refusing to proceed further and suing for
damages for breach of the entire contract, or whether the breach is
severable, giving rise to a claim for compensation, but not to a right to
treat the whole contract as broken.
Subsection (1) states the general rule.
Subsection (2) expresses the rule as adopted by the American authori-
ties and departs from the English rule which required a breach equiva-
lent to a repudiation. The American rule hereby adopted seems more
logical in making the test depend upon the materiality of the breach
rather than upon any one installment and treats an installment contract
in its ultimate analysis as a whole, which in fact it is. There are no
Washington cases exactly in point.
Sec. 46. Delivery to a Carrier on Behalf of the Buyer
(1) Where, in pursuance of a contract to sell or a sale, the seller Is
authorized or required to send the goods to the buyer, delivery of the
,O See, Prescott & Co. v. Powles & Co., note 139, supra, and Perkins
v. Minford, 235 N. Y. 301, 139 N. E. 276 (1923).
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goods to a carrier, whether named by the buyer or not, for the purpose
of transmission to the buyer, is deemed to be a delivery of the goods
to the buyer, except in the cases provided for in section 19, rule 5, or
unless a contrary intent appears.
(2) Unless otherwise authorized by the buyer, the seller must make
such contract with the carrier on behalf of the buyer as may be reason-
able, having regard to the nature of the goods and the other circum-
stances of the case; if the seller omit so to do, and the goods are lost
or damaged in course of transit, the buyer may decline to treat the
delivery to the carrier as a delivery to himself, or may hold the seller
responsible in damages.
(3) Unless otherwise agreed, where goods are sent by the seller to
the buyer under circumstances in which the seller knows or ought to
know that it Is usual to insure, the seller must give such notice to the
buyer as may enable him to insure them during their transit, and, if the
seller falls to do so, the goods shall be deemed to be at his risk during
such transit.
Subsection (1) states the well established rule which is generally
accepted in the state of Washington without comment. 141 It is similar
to section 19, rule 4 (2) of the Sales Act, which relates to title, while
here the rule relates to delivery.
Subsections (2) and (3) are as said by the draftsman in his notes
to the Act to be "probably in accordance with the business usage, but
there is little in the way of positive law on the subject."'142
Sec. 47 Right to Examine the Goods.
(1) Where goods are delivered to the buyer, which he has not pre-
viously examined, he is not deemed to have accepted them unless and
until he has had a reasonable opportunity of examining them for the
purpose of ascertaining whether they are in conformity with the contract.
(2) Unless otherwise agreed, when the seller tenders delivery of goods
to the buyer, he is bound, on request, to afford the buyer a reasonable
opportunity of examining the goods for the purpose of ascertaining
whether they are in conformity with the contract.
(3) Where goods are delivered to a carrier by the seller, in accordance
with an order from or agreement with the buyer, upon the terms that the
goods shall not be delivered by the carrier to the buyer until he has paid
the price, whether such terms are indicated by marking the goods with
the words "Collect on delivery," or otherwise, the buyer is not entitled
11 Whitman Agricultural Co. v. Strand, 8 Wash. 647, 36 Pac. 682
(1894) Roy v. Griffin, 26 Wash. 106, 66 Pac. 120 (1901) Orillia Lumber
Co. v. Chicago M. & P S. R. Co., 84 Wash. 362, 146 Pac. 850 (1915) Nel-
son v. Imperial Trading Co., note 133, supra.
'0 Miller v. Harvey, 221 N. Y. 64, 116 N. E. 781, L. R. A. 1917F 559
(1917).
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to examine the goods before payment of the price in the absence of
agreement permitting such examination.
Subsection (1) and (2) re-enact the common law and are the law
everywhere. Whether the right to examine or right to inspection is a
condition precedent qualifying the buyer's obligation either to take or
to pay the price, or a condition subsequent authorizing the return of
the goods and the recovery of the price if title to the goods has passed,
or the price has been paid, will depend in each instance on the facts
and circumstances and the contract attendant to the transaction. The
right exercised after delivery would seem clearly to be for the purpose
of the buyer determining whether he will or has become owner and to
act accordingly It would further seem that the right of inspection is
primarily if not entirely for the benefit of the buyer, although it is
possible that in an extreme case where there was some doubt as to the
goods to be tendered being in conformance with the goods called for
by the contract, the parties might agree upon an inspection as the final
determination. There are a number of Washington cases recognizing
the right of inspection and its purposes.
143
Subsection (3) is a recognition of the prevailing practice of express
companies not to permit examination before payment on C. 0. D. ship-
ments. While there may be a question as to whether the contract per-
mits such a shipment, if it does, it would necessarily contemplate that
there be no inspection prior to payment. Extending the rule to cover
cases whether the goods are marked with the words C. 0. D. or other-
wise, is merely an expression of the parties' intention and a recognition
of their right to provide for such inspection as they all fit.
Sec. 48. What Constitutes Acceptance.
The buyer is deemed to have accepted the goods when he intimates to
the seller that he has accepted them, or when the goods have been
delivered to him, and he does any act in relation to them which is incon-
sistent with the ownership of the seller or when, after the lapse of a
reasonable time, he retains the goods without intimating to the seller
that he has rejected them.
This section represents the American common law The meaning
of "acceptance" as here used is an assent to become the owner of the
specific goods offered by the seller. This may be defeated where there
" Beach v. Bellingham, 80 Wash. 287, 141 Pac. 703 (1914) Fox V.
Utter 6 Wash. 299, 33 Pac. 354 (1893) Fry v. Grangers Warehouse Co.,
131 Wash. 497, 230 Pac. 423 (1924) Gonter v. Klaber & Co., 67 Wash. 84,
120 Pac. 533 (1912) Hurley-Mason Co. v. Stebbins, Walker & S., 79 Wash.
366, 140 Pac. 381 (1914)
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is a right of inspection m the nature of a condition subsequent which
has not been waived. And it should be noted as shown in the section
following of the Sales Act that it does not mean that the buyer neces-
sarily surrenders his rights against the seller for breach of any promise
or warranty in the transaction. The Washington cases are in accord
and are illustrations of the various ways in which acceptance is indi-
cated. 4 4  But the question is dependent not merely upon a lapse of
time but also upon the attendant facts.14
Sec. 49. Acceptance Does Not Bar Action for Damages.
In the absence of express or implied agreement of the parties, accep-
tance of the goods by the buyer shall not discharge the seller from
liability In damages or other legal remedy for breach of any promise or
warranty in the contract to sell or the sale. But, if, after acceptance of
the goods, the buyer fail to give notice to th'e seller of the breach of any
promise or warranty within a reasonable time after the buyer knows, or
ought to know, of such breach, the seller shall not be liable therefor.
The general rule in the law of contracts holds that one who has a
right to rescind because of the other party's default may nevertheless
continue with the contract and accept the defective performance and
recover damages because of the defective performance. He merely loses
his right to rescind. The question of the right of a buyer who has
accepted goods to sue thereafter for damages because of their defective
quality or other defects in the seller's performance has been one of
difficulty and has created much conflict in the law of sales, This
conflict extends not only to the right of the buyer to recover in any case
but to the various classes of cases in which he may recover. The first
part of section 49, therefore, seems desirable in making certain its appli-
cation and avoiding hardship otherwise consequent on the buyer upon
holding that acceptance necessarily deprives him of the seller's obligation.
As to the right of the buyer to sue for a defective quantity this has
already been suggested under section 44, supra.
As to the right of the buyer to sue for delay in performance, this was
"" Tacoma Coal Co. v. Brad~ley, 2 Wash. 600, 27 Pac. 454, 26 Am. St.
Rep. 890 (1891) Dzckinson Fire Brick Co. v. Crowe & Co., 63 Wash. 550,
115 Pac. 1078 (1911) Kleeb v. Long-Bell Lumber Co., 27 Wash. 648, 68
Pae. 202 (1902) Singmaster v. Hall, 98 Wash. 134, 167 Pac. 136 (1917)
Carmen Distributing Co. v. Cascade Lzghting Co., 111 Wash. 487, 191 Pac.
392 (1920).
214 Noel v. Garforc Motor Co., 11 Wash. 650, 191 Pac. 828 (1895)
Tatum v. Giest, 46 Wash. 226, 89 Pac. 457 (1907) Berlin- Machine Works
v. Miller, 59 Wash. 572, 110 Pac. 422 (1910).
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early recognized in the case of Dignan v. Spurr,1 46 where the court
quotes with approval a statement by Lord Blackburn.
"When the contract was to deliver goods at a certain date,
and that date is passed, the vendee may accept the goods and
bring his action for any damages he may have actually suffered
in consequence of the late delivery He does not, by accept-
ing a late delivery, waive any claim he may have for damages
arising from the delay"
This was quoted with approval in Wisconsin Lumber v. Pacific Tank
& Silo Co. 147  Unfortunately, the later cases of Anderson, Meyer &
Co. v. Northwest Tea Co.,148 and, White v. Little Co.,14' suggest a
waiver of the right of the buyer to claim damages. In the latter case
the court suggests that the vendee's acceptance of the property in ful-
fillment of an executory contract of sale is a waiver of objection that it
was not delivered at the time agreed, unless his acceptance was qualified
by a reservation of the right to claim damages caused by the delay
This certainly was an innovation based on the citation of an exceptional
case and should not in view of this section of the Act be reaffirmed.
As to the right of the buyer to recover damages for defective quality,
the Washington Court in the early case of Tacoma Coal Co. v. Brad-
ley 1 0 adopted the rule which has since been consistently adhered to
with the exception of one case distinguished possibly on other grounds.
The court said
"It is undoubtedly true that if the brick were defective, and
appellant was silent, and did not give notice or offer to return
them within a reasonable time after discovering defects, the
right to rescind the sale was thereby waived. But the right to
recover damages on account of defective quality was in no wise
affected. Benjamin on Sales (Bennett's Notes, 1888) § 901.
It is also true that in such cases a failure to give notice or to
offer to return the goods would have an important bearing
upon the question of warranty, and would raise a strong pre-
sumption that the goods received were of satisfactory quality.
That the vendee may retain the goods without notice, and
plead breach of warranty, in an action by the vendor for the
16 3 Wash. 309, 28 Pac. 529 (1891)
'76 Wash. 452, 136 Pac. 691 (1913).
1115 Wash. 37, 196 Pac. 630 (1921).
1'118 Wash. 582, 204 Pac. 186 (1922)
I Note 144, supra.
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purchase price, is shown by numerous authorities. (Citing
cases).x5l
The case mentioned as an exception is that of Hurley-Mason Co. v.
Stebbins Co.Y5 2 The court says:
"It seems to us a sound rule, deducible from the authorities,
that, where an executory sale is made subject to inspection, an
acceptance by the buyer, with or without inspection and with-
out notice to the seller of any defect or offer to return, is a
waiver of any claim for damages on account of defects which
might have been discovered upon inspection by any ordinary
tests or by the tests prescribed by the contract, in the absence of
an express warranty intended to survive acceptance."
The citations in support of this statement are mainly New York
citations, a state which prior to the adoption of the Sales Act consistently
took the minority view that an action for damages did not survive an
acceptance. In any event, the first part of this section provides that
the seller will not be discharged from liability for breach of any promise
or warranty, by the acceptance of the goods in the absence of an express
or implied agreement.
An examination of the cases cited under the discussion of this section
while suggesting that the failure to give notice would raise a presump-
tion that the goods were satisfactory, nowhere indicates that the failure
to give notice is conclusive. In fact the court in Nielsen v. Wood-
ruff, ' expressly repudiates such a rule where the title to the prop-
erty rests in the person to whom delivery is made. In this respect the
latter part of section 49 imposes a qualification and a change in the
law of the State of Washington as it has heretofore existed. This
seems justified by business practice and avoids the hardship on the
seller of allowing a buyer at any time within the period of the Statute
of Limitations to assert that the goods are or were defective though no
objection was made when they were received. It should be noted that
the section provides not merely that the buyer shall give notice within
a reasonable time after he knows but adds the words "ought to know"
af such breach.
"'Thi rule was followed in: Dickinson Fire Brick Co. v. Crowe &
Co., note 144, supra, Fink & Marr 81 Wash. 92, 142 Pac. 482 (1914) Peter-
son v. Denny-Renton Clay & coal Co., 89 Wash. 141, 154 Pac. 123 (1916)
Valentine v. Nebraska Bridge Co., 103 Wash. 122, 173 Pac. 746 (1918)
Nielson v. Woodruff, 133 Wash. 174, 233 Pac. 1 (1925).
" Note 143, supra.
1*1 Note 151, supra.
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Sec. 50. Buyer is Not Bound to Return Goods Wrongly Delivered.
Unless otherwise agreed, where goods are delivered to the buyer, and
he refuses to accept them, having the right so to do, he is not bound to
return them to the seller, but it is sufficient If he notifies the seller that
he refuses to accept them.
Such American authority as there is, is in accord. The rule clearly
seems to be one of reason and convenience.
Sec. 51. Buyers Liability for Failing to Accept Delivery.
When the seller is ready and willing to deliver the goods, and requests
the buyer to take delivery, and the buyer does not within a reasonable
time after such request take delivery of the goods, he is liable to the
seller for any loss occasioned by his neglect, or refusal to take delivery,
and also for a reasonable charge for the care and custody of the goods.
If the neglect or refusal of the buyer to take delivery amounts to a
repudiation or breach of the entire contract, the seller shall have the
right against the goods and on the contract hereinafter provided In favor
of the seller when the buyer is in default.
There are no Washington cases directly in point. This section
states the general law LESLIE J. AYER.*
University of Washington.
(To be continued)
* Professor of Law, University of Washington.
